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In Brief
Understanding others’ intentions is
essential to successful primate social life.
Cirillo et al. explore the role of dorsal
premotor cortex (PMd) in discriminating
between self and others’ behavior while
macaques interacted with humans. They
show that the majority of neurons
encoding the future choice did so
selectively for the monkey or the human
agent. PMd thus differentiates self from
others’ behavior, leading to independent
representations of future actions.
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Representing others’ intentions is central to primate
social life. We explored the role of dorsal premotor
cortex (PMd) in discriminating between self and
others’ behavior while two male rhesus monkeys
performed a non-match-to-goal task in a monkey-
human paradigm. During each trial, two of four po-
tential targets were randomly presented on the right
and left parts of a screen, and the monkey or the hu-
man was required to choose the one that did not
match the previously chosen target. Each agent
had to monitor the other’s action in order to select
the correct target in that agent’s own turn. We report
neurons that selectively encoded the future choice of
the monkey, the human agent, or both. Our findings
suggest that PMd activity shows a high degree of
self-other differentiation during face-to-face interac-
tions, leading to an independent representation of
what others will do instead of entailing self-centered
mental rehearsal or mirror-like activities.INTRODUCTION
Social life requires the ability to understand others’ behavior and
predict others’ intentions. Many social behaviors in monkeys are
similar to those observed in humans: they can monitor each
other’s actions (Fujii et al., 2007; Falcone et al., 2016, 2017),
cooperate (Haroush and Williams, 2015), learn from observation
(Falcone et al., 2012a, 2012b; Monfardini et al., 2014), and show
altruistic behaviors (Chang et al., 2011).
Previous reports have described neurons involved in various
aspects of social understanding: ‘‘mirror’’ neurons in the ventral
premotor cortex (PMv) respond to both performed and observed
actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996), neurons
in anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex respond to others’
reward (Azzi et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2013), and neurons in
medial frontal areas represent others’ actions or intentions
(Yoshida et al., 2011, 2012; Falcone et al., 2017).
A previous study by Cisek and Kalaska (2004) reported that
neurons in dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) might be involved in
mental rehearsal of processes normally occurring before move-
ment, interpreting this activity as a covert simulation process.
The authors showed that a large majority of neurons were direc-Cell Re
This is an open access article undtionally tuned in both performance and observation tasks (84%),
and they proposed that the predictive activity of those cells was
based on a mental rehearsal process. These observations have
led to the interpretation that the neural network responsible for
planning and executing actions in PMd overlaps with the
network for observation of others’ actions.
More recently, Tkach et al. (2007) have shown a similar result
looking only at themovement period in a task with no delay. They
found that an overwhelming majority of neurons in PMd and pri-
mary motor cortex (M1) were endowed with mirror properties.
From these two previous reports, it emerges that nearly all tuned
neurons in the monkeys’ trials responded before (Cisek and Ka-
laska, 2004) and during the movement observation (Tkach et al.,
2007).
It has been shown that it is possible to use the activity of
selected M1 and PMd neurons to generate a mapping between
neural activity and the motion of a device that can be later used
by the animal for neuroprosthetic control (Wahnoun et al., 2006).
This study showed that the match between the neural correlates
of observation and execution might also lead to important real-
life applications. However, it is not clear if these results would
effectively extend to a real face-to-face interaction with other
agents.
Here, we claim that such functional overlap is not a general
feature of neurons in PMd. We suggest that the mental rehearsal
or mirror-like interpretation of PMd functionality likely arises from
the specific task features of previous studies on PMd (Cisek and
Kalaska, 2004; Tkach et al., 2007) such as a non-visible agent,
the passive observation of others’ behavior without monitoring
requirements, and a bias in the selection criterion of neurons.
To provide a more realistic interaction, we used an experimental
paradigm in which the interacting partner was visible to themon-
keys and that required the monitoring of others’ actions. More-
over, we avoided task-related neuron selection biases by not
preselecting only the neurons that were directionally tuned to
the monkey’s execution of the movement. We trained two mon-
keys in two versions of a non-match-to-goal (NMTG) task: a
spatial version (S-NMTG) and an object version (O-NMTG). In
both versions of the task, monkey and human interacted and
alternated their roles as actor and observer. During the task, neu-
ral activity was recorded using multielectrode arrays chronically
implanted in PMd.
In the delay period, prior to any movement, we found that the
majority of PMd neurons exclusively encoded one’s own future
actions. The remaining neurons encoded other’s future actions,
either exclusively or together with self-actions.ports 24, 1679–1686, August 14, 2018 ª 2018 The Author(s). 1679
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Figure 1. Task and Recording Sites
(A) Temporal sequence of events of one example
trial for the S-NMTG and the O-NMTG task. Top
right: the peripheral targets used during the two
task versions. In both cases, the correct choice
depends on previous choice.
(B) Example of a trial sequence with the monkey or
the human acting as agent.
(C) Array positions relative to principal sulcus (PS)
and arcuate sulcus (AS).Taken together, our results demonstrate that by using a real-
interaction paradigm, we can identify different neuronal sub-
strates that help recognize self and other’s behaviors and that
are not merely based on mental rehearsal activities.
RESULTS
Two monkeys performed two versions of an NMTG task (Fig-
ure 1A). In both task versions, two of four potential targets ap-
peared on the right and left parts of a screen, and the task rule
was tochoose the target that did notmatch thepreviously chosen
one (Experimental Procedures). Both monkeys accurately per-
formed trials executed after a correct trial performed by themon-
key itself (not interactive trials) or by the human (interactive trials)
(Experimental Procedures). Performance in not interactive and
interactive trials was 90.9± 1.2%and 86 ± 1.2% (±SEM) formon-
key 1, respectively, and 90.1 ± 1% and 75.3 ± 2.4% (±SEM) for
monkey 2, respectively. For monkey 1 the mean reaction time
(RT) in not interactive trials did not differ from themeanRT in inter-
active trials (t test, p=0.07, t[2] = 3.58). Formonkey2, themeanRT
in the not interactive condition was faster than themean RT in the
interactive condition (t test, p = 0.02, t[3] = 4.87). To assess mon-
keys’ motivation to continue performing the task after a human1680 Cell Reports 24, 1679–1686, August 14, 2018trial, we computed the number of aborted
interactive trials. Each monkey aborted
interactive trials very rarely (1.1% and
0.4% aborted trials for monkey 1 and
monkey 2, respectively). The proportion
of aborted trialswas not different between
monkeys (two-sample t test, p = 0.38,
t[35] = 0.89). This result suggests that the
higher proportion of errors in the interac-
tive trials for monkey 2 might reflect a
greater difficulty to monitor the human
previous choice rather than a low level of
motivation.
The oculomotor behavior of monkey 1
(Figure S1A) and monkey 2 (Figure S1B)
was similar in both monkey and human
trials during the delay and the holding
target period of the task for right and left
correct target selections.
Single Neuron Activity
Our database included recordings from
328 neurons. For most of the analyses,we focused on the delay period (0.4–0.8 s; Experimental Pro-
cedures), because in this period the coding of the future choice
could be studied independently from any movement. This time
window was common to both delay durations (0.8 and 1.2 s),
maximizing the number of trials available for the analysis. More-
over, this time window represented the period with higher target
position selectivity compared with the preceding one (28%
target position cells more than delay 0.08–0.4 s period). During
this time interval, the information on the correct target in the
monkey trials and for representing the future choice before
the action in the human trials was available, because the two
peripheral targets appeared at the beginning of the delay. The
animal could therefore either plan its future choice or represent
the human’s future choice, in the monkey and human trials,
respectively.
The percentage of cells with significant main effects or interac-
tions in a two-way ANOVAwith factors agent (monkey versus hu-
man) and target location (right versus left) was computed in four
different periods of the task. The percentage of cells with a sig-
nificant main effect of agent varied from 48% (156 of 328) in
the delay period to 62% (204 of 328) in the first 0.4 s of the hold-
ing target period. The percentage of cells encoding the target
position (main effect of target position) varied from 26% (86 of
Figure 2. Example Neurons
(A and B) Raster plots of two neurons recorded within the same session: a
monkey-only (A) and a human-only (B) cell. Top: the mean firing rate in
monkey (top) or human (bottom) trials for right (green) or left (orange) target
spatial position. Bottom: the neuronal spikes relative to the delay onset. The
gray rectangle indicates the analyzed period. The trials are sorted by the
agent performing the trial (monkey/human) and the chosen target position
(right/left).328) in the delay period to 31% (100 of 328) in the movement
time (MT).
A post hoc analysis (Fisher’s least significant difference [LSD]
test, p < 0.05) revealed which cells showed a significant differ-
ence between target positions for each agent. We then catego-
rized the cells in three different subgroups: ‘‘monkey-only,’’
‘‘human-only,’’ and ‘‘both-agents’’ cells. The monkey-only cells
encoded a specific target position in monkey trials only, the hu-
man-only cells did so in human trials only, and the both-agents
cells coded a target position in both monkey and human trials.
Figure S2A shows the percentage of cells belonging to each
group during the four task epochs. The percentages were
calculated on the basis of the total number of target position-
selective cells for each task period. In every epoch, we
observed a prevalence of monkey-only cells and a smaller pro-
portion of human-only and both-agents cells. The proportion of
cells in each subgroup was similar across delay, MT, and hold-
ing target epochs (c2[4, n = 290] = 1.93, p = 0.75), while in the
RT period, the percentage of human-only and both-agents cells
was smaller compared with the other three epochs (c2[6, n =
389] = 12.96, p = 0.04). Figure S2B shows that most cells en-
coded the target position specifically to one epoch and more
rarely maintained the same coding across epochs. This result
confirms the peculiarity of the prospective nature of the delay
period.During the delay period we identified 80 of 328 target posi-
tion-selective cells (24%) broadly distributed in each monkey’s
array. Even if the array of monkey 2 was centered in a more
rostral position compared with the array of monkey 1, 49% of
the significant cells were recorded in the estimated overlapping
portion of the two arrays. Moreover, the proportion of cells in
each subgroup in the overlapping portion was similar to that
obtained in Figure S2A for the delay period (67% versus 64%
monkey-only, 10% versus 17% human-only, 23% versus
19% both-agents, in the overlapping portion and Figure S2A,
respectively).
Figure 2A shows an example of a monkey-only cell with a pref-
erence for the right target position. Figure 2B represents a hu-
man-only cell with higher activity for the left target position but
with no difference between the two target positions in the delay
period of the monkey trials.
Figure 3 shows two examples of both-agents cells. Most of the
both-agents cells had a preference for the same target position
during both monkey and human trials, as the cell represented
in Figure 3A, which preferred the left target location. On the other
hand, only one cell changed its preferred position from monkey
to human trials. This cell is shown in Figure 3B, with higher activ-
ity for the left target position in monkey trials, but the right target
position in human trials.
Population Activity
To assess the strength of the cells tuning for the target posi-
tion in the delay period, and to compare the target position
signals between the different cell classes, we looked at the
population activity. Figure 4A displays the spatial tuning for
the monkey-only (n = 51) and human-only (n = 14) cells in
the form of population histograms. For both groups, the differ-
ence in activity between preferred and anti-preferred target
positions developed soon after peripheral targets appeared,
persisting through the delay period and beyond. For the
both-agents cells (n = 15), Figure S4A shows that the differ-
ences of the population averages between preferred and
anti-preferred target positions were similar in both monkey
and human trials.
To assess whether the spatial preferences of each cell group
were specific to the trials performed by the agent for which
they showed significance (monkey or human), we selected, for
the monkey-only cells, the trials performed by the human. The
preferred and anti-preferred target positions derived from mon-
key trials were assigned to these trials. Population histograms in
Figure S3A show that there was no tendency for the monkey-
only cells to share the same spatial preference for human and
monkey trials. This analysis was repeated for the human-only
cells, but the preferred and anti-preferred target locations ob-
tained from human trials were assigned to the monkey trials.
We also found that this group of cells exhibited no tendency to
share a similar spatial preference for monkey and human trials.
Furthermore, soon after the analysis period, there was an inver-
sion of preference for the human-only cells if considered in mon-
key trials. This suggests that the spatial preference observed in
human trials was specific to the trials performed by that agent.
As expected, when the same analysis was repeated for the
both-agents cells (Figure S4B), assigning the human rank toCell Reports 24, 1679–1686, August 14, 2018 1681
Figure 3. Examples of Both-Agents Neurons
(A) Neuron with target position coding properties in
bothmonkey and human trials. The neuronmaintains
the preference for a target position in both types of
trials: higher activity for left (orange) than for right
(green) target position.
(B) Neuron with a significant effect of target position
in bothmonkey and human trials but with a change of
spatial preference between trial types. The neuron
shows higher activity for left (orange) than right
(green) target position during monkey trials but
higher activity for right than left target position during
human trials. The plot conventions are the same as
those in Figure 2.monkey trials and vice versa, these cells showed a tendency to
share similar spatial preferences for both kinds of trials. Indeed,
as noted above, only one cell changed its preferred position from
monkey to human trials.
Population representations of the target spatial positions
were then analyzed using a neuron-dropping analysis. Fig-
ure 4B shows the neuron-dropping curves for each cell class
in monkey (left) and human trials (right). As expected, the
neuron-dropping curves computed for monkey-only cells in
monkey trials showedmuch better target position’s estimations
than human-only cells (red versus blue curves). However, the
human-only cells provided a better than chance estimation of
the target position in monkey trials. Also as predicted, in human
trials, human-only cells yielded better estimations of the target
position than monkey-only cells, even if this latter group
reached a high percentage of correct classification. Neuron-
dropping curves for both-agents cells provided similar estima-
tions for monkey and human trials, even showing higher estima-1682 Cell Reports 24, 1679–1686, August 14, 2018tions than monkey-only and human-only
cells (Figure 4B, green curves). Taken
together, the resultant neuron-dropping
curves show that the groups of selective
cells yielded more than chance reliable es-
timations of the target position, in accor-
dance with their tuning in the delay period.
Nevertheless, Figure 4B indicates that
there is no sharing of the tuning preference
between monkey-only and human-only
cells, while the both-agents cells showed
high estimations irrespective of the agent.
Classification of each target position was
above chance for even a single neuron
tuned to that location in monkey and hu-
man trials and increased as the number
of neurons increased. Figure S3B shows
the neuron-dropping curves for all re-
corded cells (n = 328) computed in the
delay period, both in monkey and human
trials. The curves show that the percent-
age of correct estimations of the target po-
sition was well above chance level in both
monkey and human trials. This result sup-
ports, at the entire neuronal populationlevel, the idea that PMd neurons provided reliable estimations
of the correct target position during observation when the hu-
man was performing the task.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we used a social cognitive task to investigate the
activity of PMd neurons during the interaction of monkey and hu-
man agents. We found that only a minority of neurons exhibited
directional activities in both self and other’s trials before action
execution. Some neurons represented the human’s future
choice, without coding the monkey’s own response. This differs
from previous research (Cisek and Kalaska, 2004) that demon-
strated similar pre-movement activity patterns in both the mon-
key and other’s trials. However, the present findings are consis-
tent with previous reports of other-selective cells in lateral
and medial frontal areas (Falcone et al., 2016, 2017). Here,
we demonstrate that not all neurons in frontal areas exhibit
Figure 4. Population Activity and Decoding of Spatial Position
(A) Mean firing rate (FR) of monkey-only neurons during monkey trials (left) and
of human-only neurons during human trials (right), aligned on delay onset. The
gray rectangle indicates the analyzed period. Error bars are ± SEM.
(B) Proportion of correctly classified trials during the delay for monkey-only
(blue curves), human-only (red curves), and both-agents (green curves) cells
during monkey (left) and human (right) trials. Dashed lines indicate chance
levels.mirror-like properties, even in a brain area widely considered to
predominantly contain neurons that ‘‘mirror’’ the actions of
others.
We focused most of our analyses on the delay period because
all the information defining the behavioral goal has already been
acquired by this time, and the activity during this period can
potentially predict the impending human response during human
trials. It was possible to analyze the neural correlates of the future
partner’s response in the delay period because the human part-
ner’s hand was always in a central position on the screen at this
time, and no visual cue indicated the behavioral goal. Therefore,
the monkey could only anticipate the human partner’s response
using its understanding of the task.
By adopting a monkey-human (M-H) paradigm instead of a
monkey-monkey (M-M) paradigm, our task design offered the
advantage of avoiding ambiguities in the representation of the
other’s future behavior, because the human choices were under
experimental control. Our paradigm allowed us tomaintain a sta-
ble predictive context and constant reward expectation during
the partner’s trials. However, this advantage comes with the lim-
itation of not being able to study error-related activity.
Similar to our previous studies (Falcone et al., 2016, 2017), we
found agent-related cells that, during the delay period, coded
which actor was performing the task. This distinction is essentialfor establishing turn-taking, joint action, and understanding or
predicting other agents’ behavior. The importance of differenti-
ating self from others is also evident in the compulsory imitative
behavior that follows frontal lobe damage (De Renzi et al., 1996),
which may be a result of a deficit in this ability. Interestingly,
agent-related cells that are preferentially active during others’
actions are absent in the medial frontal cortex of a monkey
with autistic traits (Yoshida et al., 2016).
We found three main categories of cells that were modulated
by a specific target position: (1) the monkey-only cells, which
represented the monkey’s target selection in monkey trials
only; (2) the human-only cells, which represented the future cor-
rect target position in human trials only; and (3) the both-agents
cells, which coded the future correct target position in bothmon-
key and human trials. Strikingly, the majority of cells modulated
by the target spatial position were monkey only (64% [51 of
80]) and did not encode any spatial target during the observed
human trials. Conversely, a much smaller proportion of PMd
cells exhibited the same activity pattern for both self and others’
future choices (both-agents cells, 19% [15 of 80]). These both-
agents cells might represent the behavioral goal determined by
the task rule, irrespective of the actor performing the task.
Neurons that encode abstract goals have been described by
Nakayama et al. (2016). We found a similar proportion of
human-only cells (17% [14 of 80]), indicating that the cells that
represent the partner’s future choices are not necessarily
involved in mental rehearsal of one’s own motor plan, as previ-
ously suggested (Cisek and Kalaska, 2004). The exact role of
the human-only cells cannot be determined in our paradigm,
because the human always performs the correct action. It is
therefore possible that the predictive activity of these cells repre-
sents either what the human agent will do, or what the human
should do.
Although our results demonstrate a great self-other dissocia-
tion between neural representations of actions, earlier studies
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2004; Tkach et al., 2007) emphasized the
overlap of encoding self and other’s actions. In these studies,
PMd neurons active during performed actions were also active
during observation of similar motor acts. The authors interpreted
their findings by proposing a simulation mechanism underlying
observed events. The common view that the same neural mech-
anisms are engaged both when an action is performed and
observed has been taken up by many neurophysiological and
fMRI reports as a general feature of PMd (Cunnington et al.,
2006; Hatsopoulos and Suminski, 2011; Landmann et al.,
2011; Mendoza and Merchant, 2014; Anat and Miriam, 2017).
To account for the differences between our results and those
of previous studies we need to consider the differences between
the tasks. The first general difference between our study and
those using cursors to represent actions (Cisek and Kalaska,
2004; Tkach et al., 2007) is having a human rather than inanimate
agent. A cursor displayed on a screen might not be a good sur-
rogate of a living agent. For example, it has been suggested that
neurons in lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) modulate their activity
depending on the animacy of the rival in a social competitive task
(Hosokawa andWatanabe, 2012). lPFC neurons were more sen-
sitive when monkeys interacted with another monkey compared
with a computer in this study, implying that the presence of a realCell Reports 24, 1679–1686, August 14, 2018 1683
partner modulated the observed neuronal activity. In addition,
neuroimaging studies report different patterns of brain activity
in humans when interacting with another human agent versus
a computer, emphasizing the influence of agency beliefs in social
interaction contexts (Wykowska et al., 2014; Caruana et al.,
2017).
Another difference from previous PMd studies was our
requirement of trial-by-trial monitoring of self and other’s
actions. Failure to monitor the previous response reduced the
possibility of making the correct choice during the monkey’s
turn, after the other’s trial. Analyses of oculomotor behavior
confirmed that monkeys monitored the task events comparably
during self and other’s trials.
Importantly, agents in our study were seated next to, and were
visible to, each other, switching actor and observer roles in a
real-interaction paradigm. The simulative PMd activity described
in previous studies may have been elicited by the departure from
real-world interactions, which is inherent to virtual observation
conditions. We demonstrated that the majority of PMd neurons
distinguished between self and others’ actions, and only a small
proportion of neurons with shared representations.
In contrast to the study of Tkach et al. (2007), Dushanova and
Donoghue (2010) recorded M1 activity during a step-tracking
task, in which monkeys used a manipulandum to move a cursor
or viewed the cursor being moved by the experimenter. Only half
of task-engaged neurons from the initial population were modu-
lated by the observation condition. Another study indicating a
difference between computer and living agents has described
agent-specific coding in the striatum for actions that produced
reward during an interaction with a conspecific, but not with a
computer (Ba´ez-Mendoza et al., 2013). The importance of
face-to-face interaction in generating specific representations
has also been described in monkey parietal cortex (Fujii et al.,
2007). Another example of neural flexibility, but limited to the
study of mirror neurons in PMv, is the change in the coding of
mirror neurons’ neural representations, depending on periperso-
nal or extrapersonal space of the observed action (Caggiano
et al., 2009). A similar influence on mirror neuron activity has
also now been reported (Maranesi et al., 2014).
To better understand the agency-related features of our
neuron categories, research should investigate the same brain
region using the same task with an inanimate agent, so the effect
of a partner’s animacy can be considered at different levels of
interaction. The different contexts of our study and that of Cisek
and Kalaska (2004) could change the coding of the agent; their
task design could have promoted simulation with no need of
self-other distinction. The fact that an unseen agent moved the
cursor on the screen might have favored the use of some neural
control or mental rehearsal in an attempt to move the cursor,
although it was not necessary because its motion was under
the computer control.
Our results extend to PMd a socio-cognitive role via its
inclusion in a network implicated in the representation of
self-decisions and predicting others’ intentions. This has also
been done with other cortical areas (Rudebeck et al., 2006;
Yoshida et al., 2012; Azzi et al., 2012; Haroush and Williams,
2015; Falcone et al., 2016, 2017), suggesting that social cogni-
tion does not rely on common neuronal activation alone.1684 Cell Reports 24, 1679–1686, August 14, 2018Unlike other prefrontal and premotor areas that have been tar-
geted with the same paradigm (Falcone et al., 2016, 2017), we
found a prevalence of monkey-only cells over the human-only
cells in PMd (as in lPFC and supplementary motor area [SMA]).
Conversely, a similar proportion of monkey-only cells and
human-only cells was found in the posterior part of the medial
prefrontal cortex (pmPFC) and in pre-SMA). When considering
the both-agents cells, we found that almost all the examined
cells shared the same spatial preferences, in contrast to our
previous study, in which we found that cells in pmPFC could
switch or maintain their spatial preferences in similar propor-
tions (Falcone et al., 2017). The human-only cells could
represent a neural substrate, or prerequisite, of a fundamental
capacity in the complex primate social environment: mentaliz-
ing. Mentalizing is defined as the ability to understand others’
intentions, beliefs, attitudes, and goals (Frith and Frith, 2005;
Luyten and Fonagy, 2015). Given the connectivity of PMd
with frontal areas (Wise et al., 1997; Matelli and Luppino,
2001), such as lPFC and SMAs (Johnson and Ferraina, 1996;
Falcone et al., 2016), the role of PMd neurons to represent
another individual’s intentions may be necessary for success-
ful social interactions. In autistic-spectrum and antisocial
behavior disorders, deficits in mentalizing ability have been re-
ported (Preckel et al., 2016; Yoshida et al., 2016), and for this
reason, it is very important to understand which brain areas
constitute the ‘‘social brain’’ network.
We believe that furthering our understanding of primate social
cognition is vital for development of therapies designed to treat
neuropsychiatric disorders in which anticipating others’ inten-
tions, and incorporating them into one’s own behavior, are
affected (Frith and Frith, 1999).
Here, the great majority of PMd neurons encoded a future
response in the monkey trials only, providing strong evidence
that PMd neurons can differentiate the behaviors of self and
other. Accordingly, this study also serves as a cautionary note
when interpreting neurons with mirror-like properties during so-
cial interaction.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Animals
Animal care, housing, and experimental procedures conformed to the Euro-
pean (Directive 210/63/EU) and Italian (DD.LL. 116/92 and 26/14) laws on
the use of non-human primates in scientific research. The research protocol
was approved by the Italian HealthMinistry (Central Direction for the Veterinary
Service). The housing conditions and experimental procedures were in accor-
dance with the European law on humane care and use of laboratory animals.
Twomale rhesusmonkeys (Macacamulatta) participated in this study, monkey
1 (8 years of age, 8 kg) and monkey 2 (12 years of age, 9.5 kg).
Behavioral Task
Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), monkey 1 and monkey 2, per-
formed a NMTG task. There were two versions of the task, which differed
only in the peripheral stimuli, while the duration of task periods and the basic
rule were identical. Monkey 1 and monkey 2 performed the first version of the
task (S-NMTG); monkey 2 also performed the O-NMTG task. We then decided
to use the two different versions of the task to obtain comparable performance
from the two monkeys. S-NMTG was used for monkey 1 and O-NMTG for
monkey 2, because the latter did not learn interaction during the spatial version
(performance criterion R70% after human), showing performance close to
chance. The monkeys sat in a primate chair with the head restrained facing
a touch-screen monitor (Microtouch; 19 inches, 800 3 600 pixel resolution)
20 cm away. In both task versions, each trial started with a red central stimulus
(7 diameter circle), which appeared on the screen. Once the monkeys
touched the central stimulus they had to hold it for 0.5 or 0.8 s. Subsequently,
in the S-NMTG task (Figure 1A, left), two spatial targets, represented by iden-
tical filled gray rectangles (7.1 3 7.7), appeared in two of four possible screen
positions: center left (23.5 left of center), bottom left (17.5 below and 23.5
left of center), center right (23.5 right of center), and bottom right (17.5 below
and 23.5 right of center). In the O-NMTG task (right of Figure 1A), the periph-
eral stimuli were represented by four objects, differing in color and shape, that
appeared in pairs; one to the right and one to the left of the central stimulus
(23.5 right and left of center). After the peripheral targets onset, a delay period
of 0.8 or 1.2 s began, during which the monkeys had to continue touching the
central stimulus until the disappearance of the central target. This served as a
‘‘go’’ signal, which instructed the monkeys to select one of the two peripheral
targets. After target selection, the monkeys had to touch it for a holding target
period of 0.4 or 0.6 s. On correct trials, the monkeys received water with juice
as a reward. Both correct and incorrect trials were followed by a 1–1.5 s inter-
trial interval. On next trial, the previously chosen target reappeared on the
screen together with another target, randomly selected from a list of the three
remaining targets. This could be either a new target or the target not chosen in
the previous trial. The task rule was to reject the previously selected target and
choose the alternative one. Choosing the same target that was selected in the
previous trial was an error that did not lead to reward delivery, and a correction
trial followed. An error in a correction trial was followed by another correction
trial. The first choice of every session was always accepted as correct and the
reward was delivered.
M-H Interaction
During the recording sessions (three for monkey 1 and four for monkey 2), the
monkey interacted with a human partner in a subset of trials (26% and 24% of
trials for monkey 1 and for monkey 2, respectively). The human partner was
sitting close to the animal. The human partner could only start his turn as the
actor after the monkey completed a trial, without interrupting it. The human
partner indicated his turn during the intertrial period bymoving his hand toward
the center of the screen. The monkeys learned to let the human perform the
trial without interfering. The human partner performed sequences of one to
four consecutive trials, always correct. When the human partner drew back
his arm at the end of the last trial in the sequence, the monkey started a new
trial. The interaction with the human partner started only after monkeys had
learned the task alone. The human partner was not the same for the two mon-
keys. After a trial correctly executed by the human, the monkey received the
reward as in the trials correctly executed by the monkey itself.
Trial Types
During the M-H interaction phase of the experiment (Figure 1B), we assigned
monkey trials to two categories: not interactive and interactive trials. The not
interactive trials were the trials performed by themonkey after a trial performed
by the monkey itself. The interactive trials were the trials performed by the
monkey preceded by a trial performed by the human partner. The interactive
trials were designed to test the monkeys’ ability to monitor the previous trial
performed by the human agent. We refer to this trial classification only for
behavioral analyses. For neuronal analyses we refer to the current trials per-
formed by the monkey as ‘‘monkey trials,’’ and to the current trials performed
by the human as ‘‘human trials,’’ regardless of the preceding trial type.
Single-Unit Activity
All neurophysiological analyses were performed on the activity of neurons in
correct trials, and they excluded correction trials (trials preceded by an incor-
rect trial).
We recorded 400 single neurons in PMd while the monkeys performed the
NMTG task alongside the human partner: 248 cells from monkey 1 and 152
from monkey 2. From the initial population of neurons, we selected a subpop-
ulation of 328 cells, 210 frommonkey 1 and 118 frommonkey 2, using a single-
unit stability method (Supplemental Experimental Procedures) to consider only
units that were not the same across recording sessions.We selected trials with both delay durations (0.8 and 1.2 s). We analyzed the
neural activity during four periods: the interval from 0.4 to 0.8 s within the delay
period; the RT period; the MT period, defined as the time from the detachment
of the hand from the central stimulus to the touch of one target; and the first
0.4 s of the holding target period. We performed a two-way ANOVA with agent
and chosen target position as factors. In the delay period of the S-NMTG task,
as in O-NMTG, the monkeys could represent the spatial target that the human
would select, just by knowing the task rule as in the self-performed trials. For
the S-NMTG task, the center and bottom positions of the same side of the
screen (with respect to the central stimulus) were collapsed and assigned
either to the right or to the left position to make the analysis of the two task ver-
sions comparable with each other, because in the O-NMTG task there were
only two target positions (right and left).
We focused on the delay period and performed a post hoc analysis (Fisher’s
LSD test, p < 0.05) on the cells used for the two-way ANOVA (n = 328) to
evaluate whether the target position differences depended on the agent
who performed the task. We then classified the neurons into three different
groups, ‘‘monkey-only,’’ ‘‘human-only,’’ and ‘‘both-agents’’ cells, on the basis
of whether the target position modulated the activity of neurons only in mon-
key, only in human or in both kinds of trials, respectively.
Population Analysis
We computed the mean firing rate of different populations of cells. For each
cell, we determined its preferred target position as the one with the maximum
mean firing rate during the delay 0.4–0.8 s, and we sorted the trials by this
target spatial position. We did so for the population activity of monkey-only,
human-only, and both-agents cells. To assess whether the spatial preferences
of each group were exclusively related to the trials performed by the agent for
which they exhibited a significant modulation of their activity, we selected for
the monkey-only cells the trials performed by the human, assigning to these
trials the preferred and anti-preferred target positions derived frommonkey tri-
als. We did the opposite for the human-only cells. We then performed the same
analysis for the both-agents cells.
Neuron-Dropping Analysis
To assess the strength of the neural representation of the target position in
monkey and human trials, we performed a classification procedure (Genovesio
et al., 2006) with neuron-dropping analysis (Foffani andMoxon, 2004). Neuron-
dropping curves represent how well a spatial position can be decoded from
the activity of a sample neuronal subpopulation, as a function of the sample
size (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for more details).
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and four figures and can be found with this article online at https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.celrep.2018.07.030.
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